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Sammendrag 
Teknologipolitikk er den mest utbredte formen for klimapolitikk og blir ofte foretrukket fremfor 
tilsynelatende effektive karbonpriser. Vi foreslå en ny forklaring på denne observasjonen: gevinster 
som hovedsakelig tilfaller husholdninger med store kapitaleiendeler og som påvirker 
flertallsbeslutninger til fordel for teknologipolitikk. Vi studerer klimapolitiske valg i en modell med 
overlappende generasjoner, heterogene energiteknologier og vridende inntektsskatter. Sammenlignet 
med karbonpriser, fører grønn teknologipolitikk til en klar subsidiering av kapital som kommer de 
fleste nåværende generasjoner til gode, men belaster fremtidige generasjoner. Basert på 
flertallsstemmer som ser bort fra fremtidige generasjoner, blir grønn teknologipolitikk foretrukket 
fremfor en karbonavgift. Smart "forurenser betaler" finansiering av grønn teknologipolitikk gjør det 





Market-based regulatory approaches to internalize the carbon dioxide (CO2) externality, in-
cluding carbon taxes and emissions trading, enjoy the long-standing and near-unanimous ad-
vocacy by economists (Coase, 1960; Montgomery, 1972; Baumol and Oates, 1988; Nordhaus,
1994; Metcalf, 2009). While carbon pricing is on the rise (World Bank, 2021), technology
policies—i.e., technology mandates and performance standards—remain the most widely
adopted form of actual low-carbon policy (Meckling, Sterner and Wagner, 2017). Examples
for the major fossil-fuel burning sectors in most developing and developed economies around
the world are abound: green quotas, clean energy standards, and subsidies for renewable en-
ergy (RE) technologies in the power sector, fuel economy and emissions intensity standards
in private transportation, and energy efficiency standards in the buildings and household
sector.
The economic literature offers several explanations as to why technology policy is often
preferred over carbon pricing. First, direct promotion of environmentally friendly technolo-
gies exploits positive externalities associated with innovation and diffusion of new technolo-
gies (Jaffe, Newell and Stavins, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2012).1 Second, because technology
policies contain implicit or explicit subsidies, they give rise to a less pronounced increase
in the price for energy services (for example, electricity, distance traveled, or heating or
cooling). This has two advantages: it limits negative impacts on low-income households,
which spend a disproportionately large fraction of their income on energy (Landis et al.,
2019), and it leads to smaller reductions in real factor returns, thereby exacerbating to a
lesser extent the preexisting factor-market distortions caused by the tax system (Goulder
et al., 1999; Goulder, Hafstead and Williams III, 2016). On the other hand, carbon pricing
generates revenues that can be used to address distributional concerns and the superiority
of technology policies based on tax interactions is rapidly diminishing as climate policy be-
comes more stringent (Goulder, Hafstead and Williams III, 2016). Third, there are political
economy arguments which can explain a preference for technology policies.2
This paper adds another important explanation which has so far been overlooked: gains
that predominantly accrue to households with large capital assets and that influence ma-
jority decisions in favor of technology policy over (apparently efficient) price-based climate
policy. To study the economic effects of different climate policy approaches and the conse-
quences for the well-being of different types of households, we develop a quantitative large-
scale dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations (OLG). The model
highlights several key features which are important for the choice and design of real-world
climate policy. First, “clean” energy technologies—such as wind and solar power, electric
vehicles, green buildings—exhibit a substantially higher capital intensity than “dirty” con-
ventional energy technologies. Second, the households that vote on different types of climate
policies are of different ages and therefore exposed to the product and factor market effects
caused by the policy in different ways. Third, in most countries, climate policy is imple-
mented in an environment with substantial income taxation to finance government spending,
which in turn requires consideration of the interactions between climate and fiscal policies.
The predominant view that carbon pricing outperforms technology policy is based ei-
ther on static models or on dynamic models with innitely-lived, representative agents.3 Our
1Obviously, carbon pricing is not the perfect instrument here—but empirical evidence suggests that it
can be quite effective in triggering innovation in clean technologies through higher (carbon) tax-inclusive fuel
prices (Popp, 2002; Aghion et al., 2016; Fried, 2018). Moreover, positive knowledge and adoption spillovers
and information problems can further weaken the innovation incentives from technology policies (Jaffe and
Stavins, 1994).
2Olson (1971) argues that it is easier to effectively organize special interests and narrowly focused lobby
groups demanding subsidies and privileges. Austen-Smith et al. (2019) show that legislators, in particular in
polarized political and volatile economic environments, agree more readily on inefficient technology standards
and quotas as they are politically easier to repeal than efficient instruments.
3There is a comprehensive literature on instrument choice in environmental policy (for an overview, see
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analysis suggests a different answer. By providing incentives for “clean” low-carbon energy
technologies which are capital-intensive relative to “dirty” fossil-based technologies, a green
technology policy largely mimics the effects of a capital subsidy. This benefits today’s gen-
erations of households with relatively large capital assets (which were accumulated prior
to the policy as a result of life-cycle consumption and savings decisions). Compared to a
carbon pricing policy, however, technology policies provide poor incentives for energy con-
servation and substitution away from “dirty” energy (Holland, Hughes and Knittel, 2009).
These efficiency losses in carbon abatement lead to real income losses that to a large extent
have to be borne by future generations of households.
Using an OLG framework that does not obscure the potential of climate policies to
deliver generational gains, this paper argues that the superiority of carbon pricing over
green technology policies is not clear-cut. When social valuation is based on a utilitarian
welfare perspective, we confirm the established wisdom: a carbon tax is generally preferred
to a green technology policy, while pre-existing distortionary income taxes can reverse this
ranking at low levels of policy stringency. If, however, the current population votes over
climate policy approaches, we find large support in favor of green technology policies over
carbon pricing. Importantly, the societal preference for green technology policies based on
majority voting does not require the distortionary income tax argument and is independent
of policy stringency.
Beyond instrument choice, we also highlight the importance of policy design. Specifically,
we examine how technology policies can be better designed to improve CO2 abatement
efficiency and to gain increased approval in a majority decision. We show that the way in
which policy support for green energy technologies is financed is key to very high approval
rates of today’s population for green technology policies over carbon pricing: a “smart”
green technology policy design based on a “polluter-pays” financing of technology subsidies
is preferred by 90% of the current population relative to a carbon tax.
The extent to which technology policy is favored over carbon pricing also depends on
how carbon revenues are recycled. Technology policies tend to outperform carbon tax
policies (in terms of majority voting), which forgo efficiency gains by using carbon revenues
to reduce the tax burden on primary production factors. This includes the important case
of lump sum transfers to consumers. When carbon revenues are used to lower capital
income taxes, poorly designed technology policy, such as a “blunt” technology standard,
is dominated by carbon pricing, which benefits both from the capital subsidy effect and
efficient energy conservation and technology (input) substitution. A “polluter-pays” design
of green technology policy, however, outperforms even a carbon tax policy design with a
high efficiency in recycling carbon revenues.
Our findings have important implications for the design of climate policy. Since the
transition to a carbon-neutral economy will inevitably involve extensive substitution of
capital for “dirty” fossil energy, the social valuation of capital effects is critical for policy
design. Based on the analysis of general equilibrium and life-cycle effects of environmental
regulation, we highlight that the current population may favor policy approaches which
directly incentivize the use of “clean” capital. In the absence of intergenerational altruism
(or strong intergenerational links through bequests), carbon pricing policies may find less
social acceptance than green technology policies, even if the latter puts a price on carbon
and are more efficient in a “narrow” (i.e., partial equilibrium) sense of carbon abatement.
This paper contributes to the fundamental issue of policy instrument choice and design
in the vast literature in environmental and public economics (for overviews see, for example,
Goulder and Parry, 2008; Phaneuf and Requate, 2017). A small and growing literature has
Goulder and Parry, 2008). Carbon pricing is generally considered to be cost-effective compared to technology
mandates and performance standards, regardless of policy stringency (for example, Goulder et al., 1999;
Fawcett et al., 2014; Abrell, Rausch and Streitberger, 2019). An exception is Goulder, Hafstead and Williams
III (2016) who find that, due pre-existing tax distortions, a technology mandate can be advantageous for
sufficiently small emissions reductions.
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used OLG models to assess the intergenerational effects of carbon taxes. Several studies
examine the non-environmental welfare impacts of alternative revenue-neutral carbon tax
policies using a life-cycle model (Rausch, 2013; Carbone, Morgenstern and Williams III,
2013).4 Fried, Novan and Peterman (2018) also consider within age cohort income hetero-
geneity. Karp and Rezai (2014) consider a two-sector life-cycle model where agents live
for two periods to explore the degree to which policy-induced general equilibrium changes
in factor and asset prices could affect a Pareto improvement with no direct redistribution
across generations. Kotlikoff et al. (2020) consider the optimal carbon tax in an OLG
model with climate change damages and intergenerational redistribution.5 Bovenberg and
Heijdra (2002) find that public abatement benefits the oldest generations in terms of non-
environmental welfare, whereas future generations gain most in terms of environmental
welfare. Surprisingly, the existing literature has not examined the intergenerational dimen-
sion of the classical issue of instrument choice and design between “command-and-control”
technology regulation and market-based climate policy using carbon pricing. This paper
aims to fill this gap.
Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 model calibration. Section 4 describes the
computational experiment used to compare alternative climate policy approaches. Section 5
examines the intergenerational incidence of technology and carbon pricing policies. Section
6 evalutes the different policy approaches from a social welfare perspective. Section 7
concludes.
2 The Model
We use an infinite-horizon, multi-sector Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)-type general equilib-
rium model with overlapping generations. Sectoral output combines intermediates produced
under perfect competition using physical capital, labor, and different types of energy (coal,
natural gas, crude oil, refined oil, electricity). Electricity is generated from fossil-based,
nuclear, hydro, and new renewable (wind and solar) technologies. Carbon emissions derive
from burning fossil fuels in production and consumption. The model also includes govern-
ment spending and preexisting income (and product) taxes. Life-cycle consumption and
savings decisions stem from inter-temporally optimizing households with finite lifetimes.6
2.1 Household Behavior: Overlapping Generations
Time is discrete and extends to infinity: t = 0, . . . ,∞. The economy is populated by
overlapping generations where a new generation of households g is born at the beginning
of year t = g and exits at the end of year t = g+N .7 Households are forward-looking with
perfect foresight over their finite lifetime.
Lifetime utility of generation g, ug, is of the constant-intertemporal-elasticity-of-substitution










where full consumption zgt is a CES aggregate of leisure time and consumption:
zgt =
(
αcνgt + (1− α) `νgt
) 1
ν .
4Rausch and Yonezawa (2018) also consider the impacts of using carbon revenues to reduce the size of
the federal debt in an OLG model.
5Also in a DICE-type OLG model, and abstracting from Pareto-improving policies as in Kotlikoff et al.
(2020), Leach (2009) shows that a variety of carbon policies, including an approximation of the Kyoto
protocol, leave early generations worse off.
6We abstract from all sources of uncertainty at the aggregate and individual level.
7We use “household” and “generation” interchangeably.
6
ρ̂ is the subjective utility discount factor, σ the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
σcl = 1/(1 − ν) is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, and α
determines the relative importance of material consumption vis-à-vis leisure consumption.








1−n]1/1−n, where ci and n are share and elasticity of substitution parameters,
respectively.8
In each period during the life-cycle, a household allocates its time between labor and
leisure:
`gt ≤ ωg . (2)
The generation g is endowed with ωg,t = ω (1 + γ)
g units of time in each period, where
γ denotes the effective population growth rate (including labor-augmenting technological
progress).9
The lifetime budget constraint requires that the total value of consumption cannot
exceed lifetime income from different sources:
g+N∑
t=g

























kg denotes the capital holdings of generation g at the beginning of life and p
K
0 the
purchase price of capital at time t = 0. Initial old generations, i.e. generations born prior to
period zero, are endowed with a non-zero amount of capital which represents claims on the
initial capital stock, i.e. K0 =
∑0
g=−N kg. We abstract from intergenerational bequests and
assume that newborn households enter the economy with zero capital assets, i.e. kg = 0,
∀ g ≥ 0.
τl is a tax rate on labor income, and πgt is an index of labor productivity over the life
cycle. θig is the ownership share of generation g in income derived from resource of type
i, where incomes at time t are fully distributed among generations alive at t. ∆gt denotes
income from government transfers, including potential rebates from carbon tax revenues.
Each generation chooses optimal life-cycle paths of consumption {cgt}t=g+Nt=g and leisure
{`gt}t=g+Nt=g to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to time endowment (2) and lifetime
budget (3) constraints. Utility-maximizing behavior of generation g is reflected by the










Using this condition and the budget constraint, we can derive the fraction of periodic income




(1 + ρ̂)σ + (1 + rt+1)(σ−1)
. (5)
8Figure 7 in the Appendix depicts the nested CES structure for material consumption.
9ω is a constant income scaling factor, which is determined in the initial calibration procedure to reconcile
household behavior with the aggregate benchmark data.
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2.2 Firm Behavior: Finals Goods and Energy Resource Sectors
Sectors are indexed with i, j ∈ I. We distinguish two main types of sectors: energy-
supplying resource sectors p ∈ P ⊂ I and sectors producing final goods n ∈ N ⊂ I. There
are two types of resource sectors. Resource sectors f ∈ F ⊂ P extract coal, crude oil, or
natural gas resources from the Earth’s crust and resource sectors r ∈ R ⊂ P generate elec-
tricity from nuclear, hydro, and intermittent “new renewable” (for example, wind and solar)
resources. Final goods include non-energy sectors g ∈ G ⊂ N (such as energy-intensive and
non-energy intensive manufacturing, services, transportation, agriculture), the refining of
crude oil c ∈ C ⊂ N , and the generation of electricity from fossil resources l ∈ L ⊂ N .
ENERGY RESOURCE SECTORS AND RENEWABLES (WIND AND SOLAR).—–The output of
energy resource and renewables sector p at time t, Ypt, is subject to decreasing returns to
scale and is characterized by the following nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)
production function which combines a sector-specific resource Rpt, intermediate inputs Bipt,
i 6= p, from other sectors, capital Kpt, and labor Lpt:
Ypt = [εp Rpt︸︷︷︸
Resource
input
ρRp + (1− εp) min{B1pt, . . . , Bipt, . . . , BIpt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intermediate material
inputs






where Vpt is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of capital and labor, ε is a share parameter, and
σRp = 1/(1− ρRp ) > 0 is the elasticity of input substitution.
The representative resource-extracting or renewable energy firm in sector p maximizes
static profits at time t under perfect competition:
max
Kpt,Lpt,Rpt,Bipt




subject to (6) and taking prices of output pY , capital r, labor w, and resource pR and
material pB inputs as given. st is an output subsidy (used to represent technology policies,
see Section 4).
To control for potential intermittency issues related to the resource-varying nature of
wind and solar energy, we assume that the “new renewable” technology is backed up with
a 100 percent of natural gas. This combined, synthetic technology can be considered fully
dispatchable and can be thus treated as a perfect substitute for conventional, base-load tech-
nologies (Joskow, 2011; Rausch and Karplus, 2014), and thus enables modelling electricity
generated from different sources as a homogeneous good.10
FINAL GOODS SECTORS.—–Final output Ynt in sector n at time t is characterized by
a two-stage KLEM production process (see, for example, Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996;
Paltsev et al., 2005b) in which inputs of capital, labor, energy, and materials are combined.
At the first stage, inputs Bint from other sectors i 6= n are combined with a sector-specific
capital-labor-energy composite Qnt:
Ynt = [φnmini∈I\E(B1nt, . . . , Bint, . . . , BInt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non-energy material
inputs






where E = {coal, natural gas, refined oil, electricity} ⊂ I denotes the set of energy inputs
used at the second stage of production. φn are share parameters and σ
Y
n = (1− ξn)−1 > 0
denotes the elasticity of input substitution. In the case of the refining sector (n = c), the
crude oil “feedstock” enters in the Leontief nest together with the other non-energy materials
10The extreme (conservative) assumption of a 100 percent backup most likely leads us to overestimate the
actual costs of energy supplied from wind and solar power. This is innocuous, however, considering that our
focus is on relative comparisons of different climate policy instruments.
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subject to (8) and taking output and input prices as given.
At the second stage of sectoral production, Qnt is produced by combining capital, labor,






νn + (1− θn)Eνnnt ]
1
νn (10)
where θn and βn are share parameters and σ
Y
n = (1 − νn)−1 > 0 is the elasticity of substi-
tution. Ent is an aggregate energy input which combines different types of energy:
Ent = (ξnZ̃
µn









where Zent and Z̃nt are the quantities of thermal (fossil-based) and electric energy used in
sector n at time t, respectively. ξn and ϑen are share parameters. σ
E
n = (1 − µn)−1 > 0
and σZn = (1 − ωn)−1 > 0 denote elasticity of substitution parameters between electric
and aggregate thermal and within-thermal energy, respectively. Figure 8 in the Appendix
summarizes the production structure for n-type sectors. The profit maximization problem
of intermediate goods producer n at time t solves:
max
Knt,Lnt,Zent
pQntQnt − rtKnt − wtLnt −
∑
e
(pAet + λt)Zent (12)
subject to (10) and (11) taking commodity and factor prices as given. λet is an input
tax levied on fossil fuel e used in sector n, Zent. The carbon emissions which result from
combusting one unit of fossil fuel e is given by κe.
2.3 International Trade and Supply of Final Goods
All sectoral goods are tradable. Sector-specific bilateral international trade is represented
following the standard Armington (1969) approach where goods produced at different lo-
cations are treated as imperfect substitutes. We adopt a small-open economy perspective
where the price of the foreign goods is denominated by the foreign exchange rate pft.
11
The amount of final good i supplied at time t, Ait, is thus given by a CES composite of












ψm and ξm denote the share coefficients and the Armington substitution elasticity between
domestic and imported varieties is σmi = 1/(1 − ρmi ). The final goods supplier i at time t
maximizes profits taking prices as given according to:
max
Dirt,Mit




Domestically produced goods, Yi, are transformed into exports, Xi, and domestic supply,










11Following the small-open economy model of Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004), we assume that along
the reference path, the current account deficit and GDP grow at the same rate. For the counterfactual policy
scenarios, we hold the sum of present values of the current account deficits constant at the reference level
by endogenously adjusting the foreign exchange rate.
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where ψx and ξx denote the share coefficients and σxi = 1/(1 + ρ
x
i ) is the transformation
elasticity between domestic and exported varieties. The supplier of exports and domestic





tXit − pYitYit (16)
subject to (15).
2.4 Aggregate Investments and Capital Accumulation
Next period’s capital stock of the aggregate economy depends on and last periods (net of
depreciation) capital stock and the aggregate of individuals’ savings behavior according to:
Kt+1 = (1− δt)Kt + It (17)
where δ is the capital depreciation rate. Savings are carried out by buying an aggregate
investment good It which is produced by combining final goods Ait in fixed proportions.
The total demand for aggregate investment at time t is thus given by the sum of savings





2.5 Markets and Pricing
To characterize equilibrium prices, we define additional market clearing and pricing condi-
tions. Markets for sectoral output clear, determining pYit , if:
Yit = Dit +Xit . (19)
Final goods can be used for consumption, as inputs in the production of sectoral output
and the aggregate investment good. The price for final goods, pAit, is then determined by







Bjit + It . (20)
Electricity generated from dirty and clean power technologies is a homogeneous good





where the production structure of conventional, fossil-based electricity is similar to (8).
Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix summarize the production structure for sectors of type
p, f , and r. Labor is treated as perfectly mobile between sectors but not internationally.





πgt (ωg − `gt) . (22)
Given an exogenous supply of natural or renewable resources Rit, resource markets clear
if:12
Rit = Rit . (23)
The price of foreign exchange pft is determined by balancing the total value of exports
and imports: ∑
i
(Mit −Xit) = 0 . (24)
12We thus model natural resources as flow variables (as opposed to stock variables), and we abstract from
the issue of optimal endogenous extraction of natural resource stocks.
10
Table 1. Model resolution: sectors and primary production factors.
Sectors Primary production factors
Energy resource sectors (f ∈ F ⊂ P ) Capital
Coal Labor
Crude oil Natural resources
Natural gas Coal
Natural gas
Secondary energy sectors Crude oil
Refined oil products c ∈ C ⊂ N Nuclear
Electricity Hydro










Notes: Sectoral classifications shown above are many-to-one aggregations of the 57 sectors con-
tained in the GTAP9 database (Aguiar, Narayanan and McDougall, 2016). The sectoral mapping is
available on request from the authors.
3 Data and Model Calibration
3.1 Matching Social Accounting Matrix Data
We use social accounting matrix (SAM) data for the US economy to parametrize the multi-
sectoral economic structure as well as the international trade flows. This study makes use
of SAM data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (Aguiar, Narayanan and McDougall,
2016) which provides a consistent set of global accounts of production, consumption, and bi-
lateral trade as well as physical energy flows differentiated by primary and secondary energy
carriers. We use version 9 of the GTAP database and the base year 2011. Table 1 shows the
sectors and primary factors of the model. We follow the standard calibration procedure in
multi-sectoral numerical general equilibrium modeling (see, for example, Rutherford, 1995;
Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr, 1997; Böhringer, Carbone and Rutherford, 2016) according
to which production and consumption technologies are calibrated to replicate a single-period
reference equilibrium consistent with the SAM data in the base year.
3.2 External Parameters
ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION PARAMETERS.—–The choice of values for the elasticity
of substitution parameters σ follows closely the MIT EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 2005a;
Chen et al., 2015), a numerical general equilibrium model which has been widely used
for climate policy analysis. We use the econometrically estimated substitution parameters
for Armington trade provided (Aguiar, Narayanan and McDougall, 2016). Table 1 in the
Appendix provides the parameter values.
AGE-SPECIFIC LABOR PRODUCTIVITY.—–To describe labor productivity over the life-
cycle, we use an age-related productivity profile according to:
πgt = exp
(
λ0 + λ1(t− g + 21) + λ3(t− g + 21)2 + λ3(t− g + 21)3
)
,
where the parameters of this function are selected to minimize the difference from the profile
arising by taking the average of multiple income groups as discussed in Altig et al. (2001).
The coefficients used are: λ0 = 1.0785, λ1 = 0.0936, λ2 = −0.0015, and λ3 = 7× 10−6.
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3.3 Calibration of Balanced Growth Path
We calibrate the model to a steady-state baseline extrapolated from the base-year SAM
data using exogenous assumptions on the growth rate of output, the interest rate, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and capital depreciation rate {γ̄, r̄, θ, δt}. The choice
of the annual interest rate is important for the results of a long-term analysis like the
present one. We use a value of r̄ = 0.05 for the net of tax return.13 The annual capital
depreciation rate is set to 0.07. γ̄ is set to 0.02 reflecting roughly an annual average of
U.S. economic growth experience between 2004 and 2011. To calibrate the model to the
SAM, it is necessary that the solution to the maximization problems of OLG households
is consistent with the base-year value for aggregate private consumption and income. We
employ a steady-state calibration procedure for OLG models described in Rasmussen and
Rutherford (2004) which imposes two additional constraints on individuals’ maximization
problems by endogenously solving for the time endowment parameter ω and the utility
discount rate ρ̂.14 ρ̂ is calibrated to ensure that the model is on a balanced growth path:
given a constant interest rate r, the Keynes-Ramsey rule gives the growth rate of the
economy along a balanced growth, i.e. g = [(1 + r))/(1 + ρ̂)](1/σ), from which we can infer ρ̂.
Lastly, given {r̄, γ̄, δt} we use data on base-year capital earnings from the SAM data (Altig
et al., 2001) to infer the capital stock at t = 0.
3.4 Computational Strategy
Following Mathiesen (1985) and Rutherford (1995), we formulate the model as a mixed com-
plementarity problem associating quantities with zero-profit and prices with market-clearing
conditions. To approximate the infinite horizon global economy by a finite-dimensional com-
putational problem, we use state-variable targeting (Lau, Pahlke and Rutherford, 2002).
We use the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software and the GAMS/MPSGE
higher-level language (Rutherford, 1999) together with the PATH solver (Dirkse and Ferris,
1995) to compute the equilibrium. We solve the model for 150 years (T = 150) and assume
that the lifespan of households is 50 years (N = 49).15
3.5 Calibrated Life-Cycle Behavior
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the calibrated profiles for consumption and income over the
life-cycle. Given a hump-shaped labor productivity profile over the life cycle and the desire
to smooth consumption over the life span, households derive a high share of their income
from labor at a young age and accumulate savings that are then consumed as labor produc-
tivity declines with age. Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows that this translates into substantial
heterogeneity in terms of the composition of income by source. If the climate policy is im-
plemented in 2015, generations born in or just before 2015 will derive most of their income
from labor, while older generations will have a high share of capital income and a low share
of labor income.
This has important consequences for the intergenerational impact of climate policy,
which affects the relative price of capital and labor. Carbon pricing induces a shift from
“dirty” fossil fuels to “clean” capital, raising the relative price of capital. Green technology
13Altig et al. (2001) argue for using a value around 7-8% based on the historical real rate of return to
capital, while others (e.g., Fullerton and Rogers, 1993) use a much smaller rate around 3-4%. With no
account for risk in this model it is not clear which value should be used. Also it should be kept in mind that
with these kind of models there is no “correct” value.
14Note that ω is a simple scaling factor with no economic significance. ρ is selected as the second calibration
parameter as there is little evidence on what would constitute an appropriate value.
15Solving the model for longer time horizons does not produce different results, thus indicating that the
model has been given enough time to settle on a new balanced growth path. To reduce computational
complexity, we solve the model with a five-year time step.
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(a) Life-cycle profiles for consumption and income
(b) Income shares by source for different generations
Figure 1. Calibrated life-cycle profiles and income source shares along steady-state reference path
for current generations, i.e. born before the introduction of the climate policy.
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Table 2. Overview of alternative technology and carbon tax policy designs
Input tax Output subsidy Recycling of
λ s carbon revenues
Technology policies T




Emissions intensity Proportional to carbon st = p
Credits
t None
standard (λt = γκep
Credits
t )
Carbon tax policies C
Flat recycling CO2 price (λt = κeτC) None Equal per capita transfers
Labor tax recycling CO2 price (λt = κeτC) None Labor income tax
Capital tax recycling CO2 price (λt = κeτC) None Capital income tax
Notes: Technology policies T aimed at promoting “green” RE technologies comprise two types: a technology
standard and an emissions intensity standard. Both standards are essentially a blending constraint which
translates into an implicit input tax (τT ) and output subsidy (sT ) levied on energy firms. τC denotes a
carbon tax.
policies that effectively subsidize capital-intensive “clean” energy technologies thus benefit
today’s old generations with high shares of capital income even more.
4 The Computational Experiment
We compare carbon pricing and technology policies to a “no-climate policy” baseline under
which CO2 emissions are determined by the decentralized equilibrium decisions of firms and
consumers without imposing any climate policy constraints. Table 2 provides an overview
of the alternative climate policy designs we consider.
TECHNOLOGY POLICIES.—–We consider two categories of technology policies T which
are representative of sectoral policies typically enacted as “command-and-control” regu-
lation in real-world policy. Focusing on the case of decarbonization of the electricity
sector, where technology policy seeks to promote “green” RE technologies, the elements
{Technology standard,Emissions intensity standard} ∈ T are defined as:
• “Technology standard”: mandates that a certain share of electricity must be generated
from RE.
• “Emissions intensity standard”: mandates that every ton of CO2 emissions must be
offset by a minimum amount of electricity generated from RE.
The policy category “Technology standard” thus represents most of the regulatory ap-
proaches which have been used in the electricity sector to incentivize the expansion of RE.
Such standards are essentially blending constraints which translate into implicit output
subsidies for RE technologies and implicit input taxes in energy production to finance RE
subsidies (Holland, Hughes and Knittel, 2009). By design, they are revenue neutral and
entail a redistribution of economic rents from fossil-based to RE producers. Prominent ex-
amples include renewable or clean energy standards in the U.S., renewable energy quotas in
Europe, but also more broadly subsidies for renewable energy which are financed through
an excise tax on electricity.16
Consider the case of an RE quota which mandates that at each point in time t a certain
share γt of total electricity supplied has to come from RE (wind and solar) resources—adding
16For example, feed-in tariffs or market premiums in Germany and Spain (Abrell, Kosch and Rausch,
2019). While these technology policies support categories of technologies that are considered “clean” or
carbon-neutral (e.g., wind and solar power plants), they are “blunt” instruments when it comes to mitigating
CO2 emissions because they do not differentiate between the CO2 intensity of “dirty” electricity technologies.
For example, a coal-fired power plant is implicitly subject to the same input tax as a much cleaner natural
gas-fired power plant (Abrell, Rausch and Streitberger, 2019).
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the following constraint to the equilibrium model described in Section 2:∑
p∈{Wind,Solar}
Ypt︸ ︷︷ ︸






t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Demand for RE credits
. (25)
The RE quota can be conceived as a system of tradable credits where pCreditst corresponds
to the post-trading equilibrium price of a credit determined by credit supply and demand.
A tradable RE standard is by definition revenue-neutral: expenses for RE subsidies are
fully financed through implicit input taxes τTechnology standardt on energy producers. Output
subsidies are paid to RE firms which receive one credit valued at price pCreditst for each unit
of electricity produced. From (25) it then follows that the implicit per-unit tax under an
RE quota, which enters in the firm optimization problem (12), is:
λTechnology standardt = γp
Credits
t . (26)
The interpretation is that all energy firms have to hold γ credits for each unit of electricity
produced. Because RE firms also receive one credit per unit of electricity, their effective
net support per unit of electricity produced, which enters in the firm optimization problem
(7), is:
sTechnology standardt = p
Credits
t − γpCreditst = (1− γ)pCreditst . (27)
The second policy category “Emissions intensity standard” considers a more refined
type of technology policy which entails the idea that the regulator mandates that CO2
emissions have to be compensated or offset by a certain amount of energy supplied from RE
sources. Such a technology policy is an RE support scheme with “polluter-pays refinancing”:
the expenses for RE subsidies are entirely refinanced by levying production input taxes on
fossil-based electricity firms which are proportional to the carbon intensity (Abrell, Rausch
and Streitberger, 2019).












t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Demand for green offsets
. (28)
γ represents here the “offset intensity”, i.e. the minimum amount of green energy
required to offset overall CO2 emissions from fossil-based electricity production, which is
chosen by the regulator. Here, pCreditst indicates the value of a tradable green offset certificate.
In an energy system where RE is relatively abundant, pCredits is small; it is zero if all energy
comes from green sources. If fossil fuels are still the dominant sources of energy supply,
pCreditst is large and provides an incentive for RE producers to increase their supply.
Analogously to the case of an RE quota, the implicit input tax per MWh of electricity
produced with fossil fuel e under a revenue-neutral green offset standard is:
τ Intensity standardet = γκep
Credits
t . (29)
A green offset policy is thus an RE support scheme with polluter-pays refinancing: the
expenses for RE subsidies are entirely refinanced by levying production input taxes on fossil-
based electricity firms which are proportional to the carbon intensity. This implies that RE
firms with zero emissions receive a net support equal to the credit price:
sIntensity standardt = p
Credits
t . (30)
DIRECT CARBON PRICING AND REVENUE RECYCLING.—–We consider carbon tax policies
C that involve a constant carbon tax over time under the following alternative ways of
recycling the additional revenues from the tax increase. Let R denote the set of revenue-
recycling options:
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• “Flat recycling”: annual revenues are returned lump-sum in equal amounts per capita
to every household alive in that year.
• “Labor tax recycling”: annual revenues are returned by lowering the labor income tax
rate in that year.
• “Capital tax recycling”: annual revenues are returned by lowering the capital income
tax rate in that year.
We refer to a carbon tax with flat recycling as a “plain vanilla” carbon pricing option
as it is representative of what has already been implemented or is broadly discussed in a
large number of countries either (see, for example, World Bank, 2021). Revenue recycling
options based on a reduction in income tax rates have so far been discussed intensively, but
mainly in the academic literature (Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Goulder
et al., 1999; Barrage, 2020).
POLICY STRINGENCY.—–An important dimension of our analysis is to investigate how
the policy comparison depends on the level of policy stringency. We consider different
carbon tax rates τC , expressed in 2012 US$ per ton of CO2, of {5, 25, 50, 75, 100, 125} ∈ S
which correspond to {3, 12, 20, 27, 31, 35} percent of annual economy-wide CO2 emissions
reductions relative to the “no-climate policy” baseline, respectively. The set of carbon tax
policies is thus given by C = R × S. The carbon tax rate enters the firm optimization
problem in (12) according to:
λCarbon taxt = κeτC . (31)
EXOGENOUS CO2 TARGETS AND EQUAL-YIELD CONSTRAINT.—–As we do not value the
benefits from changes in environmental quality (i.e. CO2 emissions), and focus exclusively on
the economic costs of climate change mitigation, we require that technology policies achieve
the same year-on-year emissions reductions as are achieved under carbon pricing. This
enables a meaningful welfare comparison between technology and carbon pricing policies.
Given that government spending is exogenous in our model, we use an equal-yield con-
straint for each period that requires real government spending to be maintained at its
baseline level. We endogenously determine the equilibrium value of the recycling instru-
ment (i.e. lump-sum transfers or income taxes) in each period to satisfy this equal-yield
constraint.
5 Green Technology vs. Carbon Pricing Policies: Intergen-
erational Welfare Effects
This section examines and compares the intergenerational incidence of carbon pricing and
green technologies. We first focus on the impacts of a carbon tax under alternative revenue
recycling options and then compare it to green technology policies.
5.1 Alternative Carbon Tax Policy Designs
Figure 2 shows the utility change by generation, identified by birth year, for alternative
climate policy designs measured as the equivalent variation expressed in percent of remain-
ing lifetime income (including leisure) in the absence of climate policy. The following key
findings emerge:
“Plain vanilla” carbon tax places much lower burden on the current than on future
generations: For a “plain vanilla” carbon tax with flat recycling, current old generations
incur the lowest welfare costs, while the lifetime welfare cost for subsequent generations
steadily increase: today’s middle-aged and young generations are worse off compared to
the today’s old, and future generations experience even greater welfare losses. A carbon
tax induces a switch towards capital-intensive RE technologies and hence implies that the
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Figure 2. Utility impact by generation for a $50 carbon tax and alternative technology policies with
identical year-on-year emissions reductions.
Notes: The figure shows the utility change by generation, identified by birth year, for alternative
climate policy designs measured as the equivalent change in percent of lifetime income without
climate policy. The results presented assume that a constant carbon tax of $50 per ton of CO2
emissions is implemented in the electricity sector starting in model year 2015. Technology policies
are specified so that the same year-on-year emissions reductions are achieved. Results are for the
model with pre-existing income tax distortions.
relative price of capital to labor increases. It is the current old with relatively large capital
assets, accumulated through life-cycle savings, who benefit more from this effect than the
current middle-age and young generations with smaller savings and higher shares of labor
income (compare also with Figure 1). Future generations are worse-off as they do not benefit
from this initial “capital endowment effect”.
Efficiency gains from income tax recycling make current and future generations better
off: The importance of heterogeneity in age-specific income composition becomes even more
apparent when carbon tax recycling is varied. A carbon tax with recycling via lower labor
income taxes places the least burden on today’s middle-aged generations, while leaving
today’s elderly and future generations worse off. The reason for this is that, unlike today’s
middle-aged generations, today’s elderly receive little labor income and therefore do not
benefit as much from the reduction in after-tax wages. At the same time, all current
generations hold capital assets (i.e., claims on the initial capital endowment; see kg in (3)).
This means that they are better off compared to future generations when the relative price
of capital increases. The efficiency gains from using carbon revenues to reduce distortionary
income taxes result therefore in most current and future generations being better off. The
exception, however, is the use of taxes on labor income, as this would leave today’s old
generations worse off.
Carbon pricing with capital tax recycling produces similar intergenerational incidence
as green technology policy: A carbon tax with capital income tax recycling results in a
similar pattern (but not level) of intergenerational incidence as green technology policies:
today’s old and middle generations bear lower welfare costs, while today’s young and future
generations bear higher welfare costs. Because RE production is capital intensive, green
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technology policies act as an effective subsidy to capital, which creates the same effects as a
reduction in the capital income tax. The current old and middle generations enjoy the direct
benefits because they derive a large portion of their income from capital assets and thus
enjoy the appreciation of those capital assets. The indirect benefit comes from increased
investment, as a reduction in the capital income tax stimulates investment and reduces the
existing income tax distortion associated with capital, which in turn increases efficiency
and economic growth. These effects compound over time, so that future generations benefit
more than today’s young people, who do not live long enough to reap the longer-term
benefits of effectively subsidizing capital.
5.2 Green Technology Policies vs. Carbon Pricing
Figures 3 and 4 provide, in addition to Figure 2, a comparison of the intergenerational
incidence of technology and carbon pricing policies for different levels of policy stringency.
Each figure shows the utility change by generation relative to the “plain vanilla” carbon
tax with flat recycling. A value below one means that the utility loss (gain) for a given
generation and climate policy is smaller (larger) than under the “plain vanilla” carbon tax.
It is evident that there is a large heterogeneity in utility impacts which depends on four
main factors: the design of the technology policy, the choice of recycling revenues under
a carbon tax policy, policy stringency, and the birth year of the household. The following
summary of key findings substantiates this broader insight:
Similar outcomes at high policy stringency: With a high degree of policy stringency,
all policy approaches yield a broadly similar pattern of intergenerational incidence (see the
black solid lines corresponding to a carbon tax of $125 per ton of CO2). The reason is two-
fold. At high CO2 emission reductions, the relevant substitution margin is between RE and
fossil fuels, but not between fossil fuels with different CO2 intensities (for example, coal and
natural gas). Fossil fuels are increasingly replaced by RE. Hence, the advantage of a direct
carbon price to alter the relative prices between different types of fossil fuels diminishes,
while a technology subsidy can affect the relative price between fossil fuels and renewables
just as much. Moreover, with higher emissions reductions, carbon revenues available for
recycling purposes decrease, dampening the carbon price option’s advantage of generating
efficiency gains from reducing distortionary income taxes.
Gains for current population under green technology policy at low to medium policy
stringency: At low to medium policy stringency, green technology policies significantly out-
perform a “plain vanilla” carbon tax on the basis of welfare effects for current generations
(see panels (a) and (b) in Figure 3 and the blue dashed and red dotted lines corresponding
to a carbon tax of $5 and $50 per ton of CO2, respectively). Such climate policies promote
capital-intensive green technologies, thus effectively subsidizing the use of capital. This, in
turn, boosts the capital demand and increases after-tax returns to capital owners. Since
current generations, and especially the current old, own a disproportionate amount of cap-
ital, the gains from such a policy accrue predominantly to these households, making them
better off compared to a “plain-vanilla” carbon tax, where the gains are less concentrated
on capital.17
Design of green technology policy matters for medium to high policy stringency: Whether
and to what extent future generations benefit from a green technology policy compared to
a “plain-vanilla” carbon tax depends on two factors. On the one hand, the benefit of a
green technology policy that offsets pre-existing distortions associated with capital income
taxation is large if the policy stringency is sufficiently low (i.e., a carbon tax of $5 per ton of
CO2). Both technology policies then perform better for each generation (see Figure 3). On
the other hand, the more stringent the policy, the smaller the efficiency gain from reducing
17At low stringency, future generations are also better off under a green technology policy because such a
policy reduces factor market distortions due to pre-existing income taxes. This is consistent with the results
of Goulder, Hafstead and Williams III (2016) in a Ramsey growth model with infinitely-lived agents.
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(a) Technology standard.
(b) Emissions intensity standard.
Figure 3. Utility impact by generation for alternative technology policies & stringency relative to
“plain vanilla” carbon tax with flat recycling.
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(a) Carbon tax with labor recycling.
(b) Carbon tax with capital recycling.
Figure 4. Utility impact by generation for alternative carbon tax policies & stringency relative to
“plain vanilla” carbon tax with flat recycling.
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this tax distortion. In this case, the design of the green technology is important: future
generations are better off compared to a “plain vanilla” carbon tax only with an emissions
intensity standard. The technology standard results in higher welfare losses for future
generations compared to the carbon tax because it does not provide sufficient incentives for
fuel switching from coal to natural gas. A smart design which incorporates a polluter-pays
principle thus contributes to the attractiveness of of green technology policy for the current
population.
Carbon pricing with capital tax recycling dominates green technology policy for current
and future generations, but labor tax recycling creates ambiguity: A comparison of Figures
3 and 4 shows that a carbon tax with capital income tax recycling outperforms technology
policies for all generations. However, when carbon revenue recycling is done through the
labor income tax channel, the picture is mixed: current generations would prefer a technol-
ogy policy over a carbon tax, while future generations would be better off with a carbon
tax.
6 Green Technology Policies vs. Carbon Pricing: Two Social
Welfare Perspectives
Based on the intergenerational distribution of utility impacts, we next compare the alterna-
tive climate policy designs from a social welfare perspective. First, we consider a utilitarian
social welfare perspective which aggregates the utility impact of each generation with equal
weights. Second, we look at the societal preference for alternative policy approaches through
the lens of majority voting. We assume that at a given point in time each generation alive
can cast a vote for or against a policy based on his expected utility from the remaining
lifetime. This second perspective emphasizes that the acceptance for a particular policy
approach is based solely on how it affects the well-being of the current population.
6.1 Utilitarian Social Welfare Perspective
Figure 5 compares the green technology and alternative carbon tax policies adopting a
utilitarian social welfare perspective. Formally, we follow Jensen and Rutherford (2002)








where Ȳg is the remaining lifetime full-income at present value in the “no-climate policy”
baseline and ρ is an social inequality aversion parameter. The weights Ȳg account for pop-
ulation growth and the market interest rate but do not entail additional social discounting.
The utilitarian case corresponds to ρ = 1. Policy performance is shown relative to the
“plain vanilla” carbon tax with flat recycling for different levels of policy stringency. The
following insights emerge:
Without distortionary income taxation, carbon pricing is always preferred to green tech-
nology policies: Technology policy measures (i.e., the gray solid and dashed lines) always
lead to higher welfare costs in an environment without income taxation, regardless of the
stringency of the measures. This is not surprising, since technology policies work by sub-
sidizing capital but do not put an explicit price on carbon. Thus, in the absence of tax
distortions in capital and labor markets, a carbon tax minimizes the utilitarian social wel-
fare costs of reducing CO2 emissions. The emissions intensity standard performs better
than the technology standard because it finances the implicit production subsidies for RE
technologies through an implicit input tax on “dirty” production that is proportional to
CO2 emissions. CO2 emissions.
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Figure 5. Utilitarian social welfare comparisons of alternative climate policies T and C.
Notes: The figure shows the welfare cost ratio which is defined as the percentage change in utilitarian
welfare under a particular policy relative to the percentage change in utilitarian welfare under a
carbon tax with flat recycling (i.e., no income tax recycling). A ratio lower (higher) than 1 means
that a policy is less (more) costly than a carbon tax with flat recycling. The alternative levels of
policy stringency S = {5, 25, 50, 75, 100, 125} correspond to the different carbon tax rates, expressed
in 2012US$. Technology policies T are designed to deliver the same year-on-year emissions reductions
to ensure comparability. Unless otherwise specified, the cases shown here refer to the model with
pre-existing income taxation.
Distortionary income taxes reverse the policy ranking at low policy stringency: Consis-
tent with previous studies, a technology standard (black solid line) can achieve the same
amount of emissions reductions at a lower welfare cost in an environment with distortionary
income taxes (Goulder, Hafstead and Williams III, 2016). By effectively subsidizing capital,
the technology standard mitigates the deadweight loss of income taxation, which outweighs
the direct and higher carbon abatement costs of using only an indirect instrument if emis-
sions reductions are sufficiently small. This relationship reverses under a more stringent
policy if the efficiency loss from not directly pricing carbon outweighs the gains from reduc-
ing income tax distortions.
“Polluter-pays” design of of green technology policies increases social welfare: Smarter
design of technology policy based on the polluter-pays principle can further reduce welfare
costs and ensure that technology policy works better than a “plain-vanilla” carbon tax.
However, based on the utilitarian welfare perspective, the emissions intensity standard
(black dotted line) does not perform better than a carbon tax policy that uses carbon
revenues to capture the benefits from income tax recycling-regardless of the stringency of the
policy. The intuition is clear: on the carbon pricing side, the emissions intensity standard
cannot do better than an explicit carbon tax, and the constraint on mixing production
subsidies and input taxes also means that the benefits from mitigating income tax distortions
are smaller.
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Figure 6. Share of votes by current generations for technology policies over carbon tax policies.
Notes: The figure shows the share of votes by current generations, adjusted for population size
and age-specific voter turnout (U.S. Census, 2016), in favor of a particular technology policy over
alternative carbon tax policy designs based on utility impacts of current generations for alternative
levels of policy stringency. For any pair of policies (C, T ), the generation vote is given to the policy
that provides a higher benefit. Color code indicates the technology policy T : black=Technology
standard, red=Emissions intensity standard. The dash type indicates the type of revenue recycling
associated with the carbon tax policy R: =Flat recycling, =Labor tax recycling, =Capital
tax recycling. All cases shown refer to the model with pre-existing income taxation, with the excep-
tion of the blue line which summarizes the case of both technology policies in a setting without
distortionary income taxation.
6.2 Societal Preferences for Climate Policy Approaches based on Major-
ity Voting
Figure 6 shows the share of votes of generations alive at the time of the policy’s introduction
that favor a particular technology policy relative to the carbon tax policy. The vote for
each generation is adjusted for population size and age-specific voter turnout (U.S. Census,
2016). For any policy pair (C, T ), a vote in favor of either policy is given if it yields higher
(remaining lifetime) utility.
Societal preference for green technology policies based on majority voting (in contrast
to utilitarian perspective): It is evident that technology policies, even those which perform
poor in terms of a utilitarian welfare perspective, can have a large support in the cur-
rent population. The level of support, however, depends on the specific design aspects of
technology policy and carbon tax policy, as well as the stringency of the policy. Consider
emissions reductions up to 20%. The main insight here is that, unless a carbon tax policy
is combined with capital income tax recycling (dashed lines), all technology policies are
supported by voting shares of 50% and higher. The voting shares range between 60-90%
if a technology policy is compared to a “plain-vanilla” carbon tax which forgoes efficiency
gains from revenue recycling, and slightly decrease if carbon revenues are recycled through
labor income taxes (dotted lines). A “smart” polluter-pays design of technology policies
which implicitly taxes carbon (red lines) significantly increases the voting share relative to
a “blunt” technology standard as it enhances the carbon abatement efficiency.
Policy design matters more than instrument choice at high policy stringency: For higher
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levels of policy stringency (i.e., emissions reductions in excess of 20%), Figure 6 underscores
the point that not instrument choice but policy design matters. As emissions reductions
increase, the efficiency costs of a badly designed technology policy, i.e. the technology stan-
dard, increasingly dominate for current generations the benefits from implicitly subsidizing
capital income. Thus, comparing the technology standard to a carbon tax policy with
flat or labor income tax recycling (black solid and dotted lines), it loses support. Instead,
supporting RE technologies through a “smart” polluter-pays policy design, establishes an
implicit carbon price signal while still subsidizing clean capital, which translates into high
voting shares of 60-80% (red solid and dotted lines). Notably, such a technology policy
compares favorably to a carbon tax policy that uses carbon revenues to reduce the high
burden of capital taxation (red dashed line). This is because as policy stringency increases,
the revenue available for recycling under a carbon tax policy decreases, effectively limiting
the scope for exploiting efficiency gains from lowering capital income taxes.
Green technology policy is socially preferred over carbon pricing in an environment with-
out distortionary income taxation: Figure 6 bears out another important insight. Even in
the absence of pre-existing income tax distortions, technology policies can be superior to a
carbon tax, if the societal assessment is based on majority voting. The blue line summarizes
the case which compares both technology policies T to a carbon tax with flat recycling. Re-
gardless of policy stringency, both technology policies receive support rates in the 50-70%
range. For high emissions reductions of about 30%, all types of carbon tax policies as well as
“blunt” technology standard are outperformed by a “smart” polluter-pays design of green
technology policy. Again, this is in stark contrast to a policy assessment which adopts a
utilitarian welfare perspective.
7 Conclusions
This study revisited the issue of policy instrument choice between “command-and-control”
technology policies and carbon pricing for climate change mitigation in an overlapping gen-
erations framework. The established view is that a carbon price is the most cost-effective
approach, preferable to a green technology policy. This contrasts with the popularity of
green technology policy in real-world policymaking. Our analysis provided a novel explana-
tion for this observation: gains that predominantly accrue to households with large capital
assets and that influence majority decisions in favor of technology policy over carbon pricing.
We have argued that the established view that carbon pricing is superior requires a
utilitarian social welfare perspective that values the welfare of future generations. The
policy ranking is much less clear-cut when selfish generations care only about their own
well-being and not that of their descendants. We demonstrated that the majority of the
population alive when the climate policy is put in place prefers green technology policies
over carbon pricing. Importantly, this societal preference for green technology policies does
not depend on the presence of distortionary income taxes (an argument which has been
made before to rationalize green technology policy).
Instrument choice is ultimately instrument design, so the policy ranking naturally de-
pends on how the particular regulatory approach is fleshed out. We showed that “poorly”
designed green technology policies that provide inadequate incentives for carbon abatement
result in large utility losses for the current population compared to carbon tax policies
that are highly efficient at recycling carbon revenues (for example, through reducing dis-
tortionary income taxes). “Smart” policy designs, however, which finance the subsidies
for green energy technologies based on the the “polluter-pays” principle receive very high
support (about 90%) among the current population.
We argued that our findings have important implications for the design of climate policy.
Since the transition to a carbon-neutral economy will inevitably involve extensive substitu-
tion of “clean” capital for “dirty” fossil energy, it is critical for climate policy to consider the
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social valuation of utility impacts created through effects on capital income. If the current
society does not care (enough) about future generations, our analysis suggests that climate
policy approaches which directly incentivize the use of “clean” capital, rather than penal-
izing the use of “dirty” fossil energy through a carbon price, might find easier support. In
any case, the choice and design of policy instruments for climate change mitigation requires
going beyond a mere partial equilibrium concept of carbon abatement efficiency. This paper
showed that it is of paramount importance to consider the general equilibrium and life cycle
effects of climate policy on capital income.
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Figure 8. Production structure for final goods non-energy sectors g ∈
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Figure 10. Production structure of fossil-based electricity l ∈ L ={ELE} and electricity generation
from nuclear, hydro, and wind and solar resources r ∈ R ⊂ P .
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Table 1. Elasticity of substitution parameters for production and consumption technologies.
Parameter Substitution margin Value










σcog Coal/oil—natural gas in ELE 1.0
a
σco Coal—oil in ELE 0.3
a
σrnw Resource—Capital/labor/energy/materials in renewable ELE Calibrated
σnr Resource—Capital/labor/energy/materials in nuclear ELE Calibrated
σam Materials in AGR 0
a
σae Energy/electricity—materials in AGR 0.3
a
σer Energy/materials—land in AGR 0.6
a
σerva Energy/materials/land—value-added in AGR 0.7
a
σrklm Capital/labor/materials—resource in primary energy 0
a
σgr Capital/labor/materials—resources Calibrated
σgovinv Materials—energy in government and investment demand 0.5
a
σct Transportation—Non-transport in private consumption 1.0
a
σec Energy—Non-energy in private consumption 0.25
a
σc Non-energy in private consumption 0.25
a
σef Energy in private consumption 0.4
a
σDi Foreign—domestic GTAP, version 9
σMi Across foreign origins GTAP, version 9
σ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.5
σcl Leisure—material consumption 0.8
α Weight on material consumption in full consumption 0.6
Note: aParameter values are taken from Paltsev et al. (2005b).
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